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Chaebols, a South Korean form of business conglomerate, achieved high profits after the 
Asian currency crisis and dramatically reduced their debt-equity ratios. At the same time, 
chaebols continued to increase their assets at high growth rates. However, ownership shared 
by their heads tended to be gradually smaller, resulting in more serious separation of cash 
flow ownership from corporate control power. Concentration of economic power driven 
by chaebols continued to increase. Despite their business success and huge expansion, 
their labor demands and contributions to domestic economy sharply decreased after the 
currency crisis. The average number of employees for 5 major chaebols was about 460,000 
during 2006 to 2010, which was less than 480,000 during 1991 to 1995. Value added and 
employment inducement coefficients of total exports in South Korea, mainly driven by large 
companies like chaebols, have consistently and substantially decreased since 1995. This study 
suggests four reasons why chaebols’ successful growth does not have as strong an effect on the 
South Korean economy as before. First, the industry structure has been changed from labor-
intensive to capital and technology intensive industries, resulting in less demand for labor. 
Second, increases in new technology and labor productivity substantially reduced labor 
inducement coefficients of exports across all industries. Third, because of globalization effect, 
large companies like chaebols have easy access to cheaper or competitive oversea intermediate 
goods. Strong dependence of their exports on imports, however, reduced the positive effects of 
exports on the economy. Last, substantial increases in overseas investments by chaebols after 
the Asian currency crisis resulted in less demand for domestic labor. The dwindling effect of 
the chaebols on the South Korean economy implies that the export-driven economy model 
did not appear to be successful in activating the domestic economy after the currency crisis. 
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I. INTRoDUcTIoN
South Korea (hereafter Korea) was one of the world’s poorest countries in the 
early 1960s. GNP per capita in Korea was only $87 in 1962 when Ghana and 
Sudan had a similar income level and the Philippines had about three times 
the income. Although Korean economic growth has begun to slow down 
since the 1990s, Korea consistently achieved high growth beginning from 
the 1960s except for during a few economic crises. GDP per capita in Korea 
exceeded $20,000 in 2012, with purchasing power close to $30,000.
Korean economic development has been achieved by the government’s 
aggressive economic policies and leadership under the capitalism economic 
system where private ownership is warranted. Financial and non-financial 
benefits were given to companies that strategically adapted themselves to 
economic development policies. Along with these benefits, some companies 
grew into chaebols that are a Korean form of business conglomerate, typically 
global multinationals owning numerous international enterprises. Korean 
economic development, referred to as compressed growth, may be possible 
mainly due to the surprising success of the chaebols. However, it would be 
doubtful for them to have grown into today’s big business conglomerates 
without benefits and supports given by the Korean government. The Korean 
economy has maintained cooperative partnerships with chaebols whatever 
the government’s intention might be. The economy has fallen and risen with 
chaebols. For example, the Asian currency crisis in 1997 overshadowed the 
Korean economy along with the crisis of the chaebols.
The weight of the chaebols in Korea’s economy is dominantly high. While 
the ratio of their assets to GDP was 35.1% in 1992, it rose to 60.3% in 1998 
with increases of 25.2% points for 6 years. The ratio of 5 major chaebols’ 
assets to GDP was 32.8% in 2002, the lowest level after the currency crisis. 
Afterward, it consistently increased to 48.6% in 2010 with increases of 15.8% 
points for 8 years. The consistent increase of this ratio is noteworthy although 
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its level is not as high as during the period of the currency crisis. However, 
the number of chaebols’ affiliates is currently much larger. For example, 
affiliated firms of 5 major chaebols were 366 in 2010, which increased by 43% 
from 1999.
The concentration of economic power driven by chaebols attracts public 
attention again after the Asian currency crisis. However, the reason for this 
recent attention is different. Although the business performance of chaebols 
looks great, their contributions to the Korean economy seem to be smaller 
than before. There are two opposing opinions about chaebols. According 
to the positive opinion, chaebols are a mainstay of Korean economic 
development and a hero of Korean exports. High-tech products made by 
chaebols dominate the global market and their brands are icons for the 
high status of Korea in the world. Their strong competitiveness in the world 
markets resulted in continuous export increases and economic growth despite 
the global economic recession beginning in 2007.
From the opposite point of view, by using their monopoly power, chaebols 
urge small and medium sized firms to make unfair transactions with 
them. The chaebol chairman or head makes his own arbitrary decisions by 
thoroughly controlling the board of directors. Further, chaebols covetously 
expand their business to small-scale business areas through their superior 
capital power. The concentration of economic power driven by chaebols is a 
symbol for the increased income disparity between the rich and the poor in 
Korea.
The negative argument about chaebols has become stronger, although 
more than 10 years has passed since the currency crisis. The government 
of President Lee Myung-bak made company-friendly economic policies 
such as corporate tax reduction, abolition of limits on investments of large 
companies, a number of deregulation actions, a currency policy for boosting 
exports and so on. Nevertheless, there is no clear sign that the domestic 
economy was activated. Moreover, although Korea’s economy still grows, it 
is criticized as jobless growth. Income disparity tends to increase. Although 
chaebols appear to continuously make success stories for themselves, why 
have they not played the role of locomotive in the Korean economy anymore? 
A major criticism of chaebols at the time of the currency crisis was about 
their poor capital structure caused by reckless asset expansion, poor business 
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performance, disparity between the ownership share of the chairman and his 
control power, and concentration of economic power by chaebols. After the 
crisis, how much have they overcome these problems?
There are two purposes for this study. First, it examines the soundness of 
five major chaebols in terms of capital structure, profitability, and ownership 
structure after the crisis. Particularly, the main interest lies in how they 
financed rapid asset expansion. Second, the study investigates the effects of 
the chaebols’ growth on the Korean economy and discusses why their growth 
has not contributed to activation of the domestic market in Korea anymore.
choi (2009a) investigated whether reformation measures about chaebols 
improved their soundness between the pre-Asian currency crisis and post-
crisis in terms of capital structure, profitability, ownership structure, cross-
shareholding, transparency, and specialty by employing panel data for 30 
major chaebols from 1986 to 2007. This study reviews the same issues since 
it likewise examines capital structure, profitability, and ownership structure. 
However, the study considers mutual relationships among these factors by 
using 5 chaebols’ combined or consolidated financial statements, which 
can be differentiated from choi’s study. For example, this study analyzes 
change in chaebols’ capital structure by focusing on how they financed asset 
expansion. Since debt was the major channel to finance asset expansion 
before the financial crisis, chaebols’ debt-equity ratios were very high at that 
time. However, financing can be done by increases in debt, seasoned offerings 
or internal funds. Since these financing channels are closely related to capital 
and ownership structures and their profitability, this study analyzes their 
financing channels and their mutual relationships.
There is no study found about why chaebols have not contributed to 
activation of the domestic economy as much as before. Although they 
achieved great business performance in the world markets, this does not 
appear to have activated the domestic demand market. Such a phenomenon 
was not found in the process of Korean economic development before the 
currency crisis. This study examines the chaebols’ effect on employment 
over time by using employment coefficients of 5 major chaebols. It also 
investigates changes in inducement coefficients of exports’ value added, 
job creation and employment before and after the currency crisis by using 
the input-output table of the Bank of Korea. Since the input-output table 
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only provides inducement coefficients for final demand, it is not possible to 
calculate inducement coefficients caused by chaebols’ sales. chaebol exports, 
however, account for a substantial proportion of total exports in Korea. 
Instead of chaebol revenues, this study will examine the effect of exports on 
the domestic economy.
The structure of the study remainder is as follows. The related literature 
is reviewed in chapter II. chapter III analyzes 5 major chaebols’ capital 
structure, profitability and ownership structure. chapter IV examines how 
increases in Korean exports and chaebol revenue influenced employment 
and domestic added value to understand the effect of chaebols’ growth on 
the Korean economy before and after the Asian currency crisis. chapter V 
presents study conclusions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Academic research about chaebols in Korea mainly focuses on their history, 
empirical research about relations between their ownership structure 
and their value, analyzes about the gap between cash flow ownership and 
controlling power, and evaluations of reformation policies about chaebols. 
Lee (2010) chronologically explained in detail how individual companies 
could grow into chaebols. He identified characteristics of each chaebol as well 
as traced the historical backgrounds of their growth. choi (2009b) selected 
30 major chaebols based on firms’ revenues in 1980 and reported how they 
had changed up to 2007. 10 chaebols were dismantled and 4 were dropped 
from the 30 major ones. only 16 chaebols survived and have continued to 
grow for 27 years. Reckless expansion relying on debt may be a main factor in 
the  failures of those 14 chaebols. Each chaebol, however, had its own reasons 
for failure. 7 new chaebols taking a place among the 30 major chaebols were 
companies that were separated from existing ones. This suggests that new 
chaebols can emerge on the strength of existing chaebols’ vested rights.
Empirical results about the value of chaebols or their performance vary 
over time. chang and choi (1988) reported that the profitability of chaebols 
was superior to that of non-chaebol firms from the 1970s to the 1980s. 
However, other studies (choi and cowing 1999; Joh 2003; Ferris et al. 2003) 
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concluded that profitability and efficiency of chaebols were lower in the 
1990s. Lee, Kim, and Lee (2010) provided varied empirical results depending 
on the time periods. They showed that chaebols did not lose their value 
compared to non-chaebols from 1984 to 1988 but they lost their market value 
due to overinvestment from 1990 to 1995. However, they were more highly 
valued again from 2001 to 2005. choo et al. (2009) claimed that chaebols’ 
good performance after the Asian currency crisis was due to a reduction of 
investment inefficiency and sharing their advanced technology with their 
own affiliates.
chang et al. (2001) examined 30 major chaebols in regards to ownership. 
They reported that the average direct ownership of controlling shareholders 
was only 5.4% in 1999, which was about one third of the ownership in 
the early 1980s. controlling shareholders whose direct ownership tended 
to decrease maintained their controlling power over affiliates through 
cross-shareholding. This phenomenon was confirmed by Kim (2003) 
who investigated shareholder’s ownership distribution from 1997 to 2002. 
ownership of controlling shareholders and their families tended to decrease 
but inside ownership including their affiliates has rarely changed over 
time. As such, the discrepancy between ownership and controlling power 
continued to increase. Kim (2007a) estimated the cross-shareholding of 
30 major chaebols’ affiliates from 1997 to 2005. He presented that cross-
shareholding rapidly increased for 8 years. While only 7 chaebols out of 30 
employed cross-shareholding in 1997, 17 chaebols did so at the end of 2005. If 
cross-shareholding was removed, KRW 303 billion of total net capital in 1997 
and KRW 3,772 billion in 2006 would disappear.1 Such cross-shareholding 
tends to increase to avoid regulation of mutual shareholding and to maintain 
controlling power of major shareholders at the same time.
Sung and Kim (2008) evaluated various reformation policies about 
chaebols and suggested alternative policies. After the currency crisis, 
strengthened regulation of chaebols was gradually alleviated. For example, 
1 Fictitious capital is created by cross-shareholding. company A purchases KRW 10 
billion of stocks from company B which purchases the same amount of stock from 
company c. If company c purchases KRW 10 billion of stocks from company A, 
cross-shareholding is made without KRW 10 billion of actual investment.
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exceptional clauses for limits on total investment became more generous in 
2002 and its exemption requirements were alleviated in 2004. This points 
out that limits on total investment have not been valid anymore since 2007. 
They suggested a ban on cross-shareholding, strengthened limits on total 
investment, and restrictions on holding companies and their affiliates. 
chang and Lee (2012) evaluated policies about large company groups for a 
reduction in concentration of economic power. They suggested that general 
concentration of economic power and diversification of businesses by large 
company groups tended to increase after the middle 2000s but the negative 
effects were not severe. As such, they reported that the policy for large 
company groups changed from limits on total investment to prevention 
of unfair internal trading and post-monitoring. They argued that such 
policy changes are appropriate. ownership concentration by large groups 
has become more serious. They claimed that it is required to protect small 
shareholder’s rights by improving corporate governance rules.
III. STATUS oF cHAEBoLS
A chaebol is a group of affiliated firms that is actually controlled by its 
chairman or head. chaebols are usually ranked in order of their asset size. 
This study analyzes the current status of five major chaebols. Table 1 shows 
how the rankings have been changed over time based on the years when 
ranking changes are noteworthy. Public companies or recently privatized 
companies such as Korea Express corporation and KT were ruled out. 
Table 1. Ranking changes of chaebols from 1987 to 2011




































Source:  Information System for Large corporation Group (http://www.ftc.go.kr/); Song 
and Lee’s (2005) appendix cD.
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Hyundai’s ranking was unchanged as number one from 1987 to 1999 when 
Samsung and Daewoo were in rotation ranked in second or third place. After 
Hyundai Motor was separated from Hyundai in 2000, Samsung rose to the 
top.
It is interesting that Hyundai Motor was ranked as fifth in 2000 but in 
second place since 2005. LG whose business structure was changed to a 
holding company in 2003, was ranked as second from 2002 to 2004 but in 
third or fourth place after GS Holdings was split from LG Group. Hanjin 
was ranked as fifth from 1987 to 1989 but afterward dropped out from the 
top five. Instead, Lotte was in fifth place. SK was also listed as one of the five 
major chaebols. After 2006, the rankings of the five major chaebols did not 
change. If Hyundai Motor is regarded as part of the Hyundai group, there are 
only seven companies listed in the top five during these years.
1. Analysis of Financial Structure
This study analyzes the financial structure of chaebols after the currency 
crisis by using five major chaebols’ combined or consolidated balance sheets. 
consolidated balance sheets put all individual balance sheets together by 
treating all affiliated companies as one company. combined balance sheets are 
basically same as the consolidated balance sheet but include more companies 
that are controlled by the head of the chaebol. In the case of combined or 
consolidated balance sheets, since all affiliated firms are regarded as one 
single company, inter-transactions among them are canceled out. Therefore, 
these balance sheets help in understanding actual business performance 
and capital structures of chaebols. Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 present financial 
analyses based on 5 selected years from 1999 to 2010. Hyundai Motor has 
been in second place since 2006, while Hyundai itself does not belong to 
even the 10 major chaebols. As such, Hyundai Motor is included as a major 
chaebol but Hyundai is excluded.
Samsung’s assets increased by about three times from 1999 to 2010, 
while its debt increased by 2.4 times for the same period. Samsung did not 
usually rely on bond issues or loans to finance asset expansion.2 The source of 
2 Bonds include domestic and foreign bonds, convertible bonds, bonds with warrants, 
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funding can be found from the 5.3 times increase of total equity. capital stock 
and capital surplus increased from KRW 16.49 trillion in 1999 to KRW 18.66 
and so on, while loans consist of loans from banks and bonds with remaining maturity 
of less than one year. 
Table 2-1. Financial Analysis of Major chaebols: 1999-2010
(Unit: KRW trillion)







































































































































































Source:  Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART), Financial Supervisory 
Service (www.dart.fss.or.kr)
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trillion in 2010. Because of the small increase in capital stock and surplus, 
new equity issues were not a main source for financing asset expansion. 
Retained earnings, however, substantially increased from KRW 5.12 trillion 
in 1999 to KRW 109.68 trillion in 2010, which indicates a 21.4 times increase 
for 11 years. The high profitability of Samsung could generate substantial 
internal funds, which made it possible to rapidly increase its assets without 
heavily relying on debt.
The current ratio is defined as current assets divided by current liabilities, 
which indicates whether the company has enough assets to cash in for paying 
out debt with a maturity of 1 year or less. The current ratios of Samsung were 
over 150% except for 1999, which suggests it had enough short-term assets.
The assets of Hyundai Motor were KRW 25.39 trillion in 1999, which 
was 25% of Samsung’s assets but rapidly increased by 5.7 times for 11 years. 
Hyundai Motor actively used retained earnings to expand its assets. Its 
retained earnings increased from KRW 1 trillion in 1999 to KRW 31.96 
trillion in 2010. Its dependence on retained earnings for asset increases 
is similar to Samsung’s. However, Hyundai Motor employed all possible 
financing channels for rapid asset increases. As the debt of Hyundai Motor 
increased by 6 times in 11 years, it also aggressively used debt for investment 
funds and issued substantial new equities as well. capital stock and capital 
surplus was KRW 7.07 trillion in 2005 but increased to KRW 12.72 trillion 
in 2008. Since the current ratio was lower than 100% in all years except 
2010, Hyundai Motor might suffer from a shortage of short-term funds. The 
shortage, however, was not caused by low profitability but by rapid asset 
expansion. In short, Hyundai Motor has used all financial channels such as 
debt, new equity issues and retained earnings for rapid asset expansion.
Although GS Holdings was founded by splitting the energy and 
distribution enterprises off from the LG Group in 2004, it is included in LG 
to maintain the consistency of time-series analysis. LG’s assets increased by 
two fold from KRW 54.97 trillion in 1999 to KRW 110.54 trillion in 2010. 
Although its total assets tended to decrease between 2002 and 2005, such an 
asset decrease seemed to be temporary in the process of spinning LS cable 
& System off from LG. Total equity of LG increased from KRW 12.05 trillion 
in 1999 to KRW 43.88 trillion in 2010. Particularly, increases in retained 
earnings were substantial. The debt-equity ratio decreased from 355% in 1999 
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to 152% in 2010, while the current ratio improved by increasing from 83% 
in 1999 to 118% in 2010. As a result, LG were more likely to finance asset 
increases with equity than debt. 
Table 2-2 shows financial variables for SK, Lotte and Hanjin. SK had the 
fourth largest assets among chaebols in 1999. SK has the ownership structure 
Table 2-2. Financial Analysis of Major chaebols: 1999-2010 
(Unit: KRW trillion)






































































































































































Source:  Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART), Financial Supervisory 
Service (www.dart.fss.or.kr)
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of a holding company. Its assets increased by 2.3 times from 1999 to 2010. 
capital stock and capital surplus increased by KRW 14.9 trillion for 11 years, 
which mainly resulted from issuing new equities. As a result, the debt-equity 
ratio decreased from 256% in 1999 to 185% in 2010. It is noteworthy that 
increases in SK’s assets were mainly financed by new equity issues. Lotte was 
placed in the fifth ranking. Its asset expansion was funded by both internal 
funds and external funds such as loans, bond issues and equity issues. Its 
financial channels for asset expansion were similar to Hyundai Motor’s. 
Hanjin’s assets did not grow rapidly like other chaebols. Its assets were KRW 
25.58 trillion in 1999 and KRW 30.54 trillion in 2010.
In summary, Samsung and LG tended to use internal funds to expand 
their assets. Hyundai Motor and Lotte relied on all financial channels for 
their investment funds, while they controlled their debt-equity ratios under 
a reasonable level. Unlike other chaebols, SK increased its assets mainly with 
new equity issues.
2. Profitability Analysis 
Profitability of chaebols is examined based on revenues, operations income, 
and net income. Table 3 shows that Samsung achieved consistent and high 
profits for 11 years. As previously explained in the financial analysis, the high 
profitability of Samsung made it possible to rapidly increase its assets without 
relying on high leverage or substantial equity issues. Samsung recorded 
the lowest RoE in 2008 when the world began to be in a serious economic 
recession. However, its RoE in 2008 was still higher than any other chaebol. 
Its high profit margin rate, which was over 10% except for 2005 and 2008, 
indicates strong competitiveness of its products. Net income reached KRW 
23.45 trillion in 2010.
Hyundai Motor, whose asset growth rate was the highest among chaebols, 
had smaller net income than the sum of the LG and GS net income until 
2008. However, the net income of Hyundai Motor was KRW 10.13 trillion in 
2010, which was the second largest. The profit margin rate of Hyundai Motor 
was not as high as for Samsung or other chaebols, which indicates that the 
automobile market was highly competitive. Although the RoE of Hyundai 
Motor was up-and-down over time, 20% of its RoE in 2010 indicates high 
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Table 3. Profitability of Major chaebols: 1999-2010 (Unit: KRW trillion)



























































































































































































Source:  Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART), Financial Supervisory 
Service (www.dart.fss.or.kr). * Margin rate (%) is defined as operating income di-
vided by revenues; **RoE (%) is net income divided by total equity.
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profitability. Its revenues increased by 5.4 times for 11 years.
LS and GS revenues also rapidly increased. Table 3 shows a stable growth 
rate for their revenues. Their profit margin rates were about 5~6%, which was 
lower than Samsung that had similar business. However, their RoEs were 
much higher than 10% in most years. The reason for the high RoEs lies in 
its high asset turnover. The asset turnover shows how many times assets turn 
over to generate annual revenues. The higher asset turnover a company has, 
the more efficiently its assets are used. Samsung’s asset turnover was only 
66.7% in 2010, while for LG and GS it was 140.6% in the same year. As such, 
LG and GS could generate the same revenue with smaller assets. 
SK’s revenues were KRW 90.7 trillion in 2010, which was about 1/3 of 
Samsung’s. SK had KRW 3.33 trillion of operating income but it had 4.69 
trillion of net income losses in 2002. These net losses occurred because of 
substantial special losses in 2002. These losses resulted from reflecting its 
accumulated losses that were generated in the past but were hidden probably 
because of window dressing. While the profit margin rates of SK did not 
seem to be worse than Hyundai Motor’s or LG and GS’s, its RoEs were 
poorer except for 2005. Lotte’s operation income and net income continued 
to increase. Although its profit margin rates and RoEs were not high, they 
were in the range of 5~10%. Hanjin’s revenue did not increase at all and its 
net income was much lower than any other chaebol. As a result, it recently 
dropped out from the five major chaebols.
3. Ownership Structure
Data about the chaebols’ ownership structure and concentration of 
economic power were collected from the corporate Group Portal of Fair 
Trade commission. Since these data only consider domestic affiliated 
firms, they were not consistent with those of consolidated or combined 
financial statements. The Fair Trade commission’s data provide voting rights 
ownership share and inside ownership share. Voting rights ownership share 
is the proportion of stocks with voting rights controlled by the head of a 
chaebol, his family members, and all affiliated firms, while inside ownership 
share is the proportion of their stocks. Voting rights ownership share is 
usually higher than inside ownership share because the head, his related 
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persons or affiliated corporations normally have stocks with voting rights 
instead of non-voting rights stocks. Since voting rights ownership share was 
only available until 2008, this study analyzes ownership structure by using 
inside ownership share based on capital stock. one of the advantages for 
inside ownership share is that one can analyze ownership proportion based 
on actual investments made by the head, its relative persons or firms.
The head and his family’s ownership tended to decline. chang et al. (2001) 
reported that the head and his family’s ownership for five major chaebols was 
on average 15.6% in 1987, 8.6% in 1997, and 4.6% in 1999. The ownership of 
affiliates was in the range of about 35% to high 40%. Inside ownership was 
stable over time from about 45% to low 50%. Such a proportion is enough to 
maintain corporate controlling power over the chaebol affiliates.
The chaebol ownership structure analysis had results similar to those 
of chang et al.(2001). Table 4 shows how five major chaebols’ ownership 
structures changed from 2002 to 2010. The head’s ownership in Samsung 
was only 0.28% in 2005 and 0.53% in 2010. Family ownership also tended to 
decrease from 1.54% in 2002 to 0.68% in 2010. The sum of the head and his 
family’s ownership was only 1.21% in 2010 but affiliated firms of Samsung 
had about 30% to high 40% of ownership. As a result, total inside ownership 
share did not show any significant change.3
Although Hyundai Motor aggressively increased its assets by using new 
equity issues as well as debt and retained earnings, its head and family’s 
ownership tended to increase. Particularly, the family’s ownership increased 
from 0.06% in 2002 to 1.67% in 2010. The ownership share of its affiliated 
firms as well as the inside ownership was similar to Samsung’s. Although 
the sum of the head’s and his family’s ownership in LG tended to gradually 
decrease, the inside ownership was maintained at about 40%. The head and 
his family’s ownership in SK was dramatically reduced. In 2002, the head’s 
3 When we analyze a company’s ownership, indirect ownership need be considered 
as well. For example, the head has direct ownership in the company. His ownership, 
however, also exists through other affiliates’ ownership since the head also has 
ownership in the affiliates. If such indirect ownership is considered, the head’s 
ownership can marginally increase. However, the marginal increase should not change 
any significant difference regarding the study results. Please refer to Kim (2007) for a 
detailed explanation about chaebols’ ownership and inside ownership shares.
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ownership was 2.51% in 2002 and only 0.08% in 2010. The total of the head’s 
and his family’s ownership was 0.99% but its affiliates’ ownership was 54.05% 
in 2010. As such, the head of SK controlled all affiliates by heavily relying 
on ownership of the affiliated companies. The ownership of Lotte’s head was 
Table 4. Inside ownership Share of Major chaebols Based on capital Stock (%)





























































































































































Source: corporate Group Portal of Fair Trade commission (http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr)
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0.05%, which was the lowest among major chaebols. However, the inside 
ownership was 32.69% in 2002 and over 50% after 2005.
Average ownership of the major chaebols’ head and family tended to 
gradually decrease. It decreased from 15.6% in 1987 to 2.65% in 2010. It 
is interesting that ownership of both the head and his family decreased 
although chaebols’ profits and internal funds were high. This indicates that 
their asset expansion appeared to be even larger than the increases in internal 
funds. ownership of affiliates seems to be a key factor that enabled a chaebol 
head to successfully control the affiliates although the head’s ownership was 
very small. Such a governance structure may cause serious agency problems. 
Further, it has serious potential disadvantages such as a domino effect, which 
means that a certain company’s bankruptcy can sequentially damage other 
affiliates.
IV.  EFFEcT oF cHAEBoLS’ GRoWTH oN KoREAN 
EcoNoMy
There are several possible reasons why the business performance of chaebols 
was extremely poor during the currency crisis. Academic literature points 
out poor capital structures due to over-loans, and poor profitability due to 
overinvestment or excessive diversification of businesses. According to chang 
et al. (2001), the average debt-equity ratio of 30 major chaebols was 303.3% 
in 1989 and 579.3% in 1997. It was much higher than the debt-equity ratio 
in other countries: U.S. (153.8%), Japan (186.4%), and Taiwan (85.7%). The 
average debt-equity ratio of the Korean manufacture industry was 396.3% in 
1997. The profit margin rate of 30 major chaebols was on average only 2.3% 
from 1991 to 1997 (choi (2009a)). However, the asset increases of chaebols 
after the currency crisis were different since they showed sound asset 
expansion in terms of profitability and capital structure.
There is growing criticism about chaebols that their high profits and 
growth rates do not spread over to the whole economy in Korea as much as 
before. The next section deals with labor employment issues and examines 
why the positive effect of chaebols’ growth on the Korean economy is not as 
strong as before. This study also investigates inducement coefficients of added 
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value, job creation and employment related to exports since chaebol exports 
account for a substantial proportion of Korean exports.4 
1. Labor Demand and Foreign Investment of Chaebols 
Table 5 presents the changes in average employment numbers for five major 
chaebols. Average employment was 480,800 for 1991 to 1995 just before the 
currency crisis. It dramatically decreased to 371,000 for 2001 to 2005 and 
thereafter increased to 463,121 for 2006 to 2010, which is less than for 1991 
to 1995. Table 5 suggests that the labor demand of the five major chaebols 
substantially fell down, which is surprising considering the rapid increases in 
their assets and revenue.
Table 5 also reports employment coefficient, which shows how many 
employees were hired per KRW 1 billion of revenues based on 2005 constant 
prices. The price level was adjusted by using a GDP deflator. Employment 
coefficients decreased from 3.59 persons for 1987 to 1990 to 1.21 persons for 
2006 to 2010. Except for 2001 to 2005, the employment coefficient continued 
to decrease. Based on 2008, the average employment coefficient was 1.28, 
while the coefficient in the manufacturing, service, and construction 
4 The inducement coefficient of added value shows how much added value is created 
in domestic economy when one final unit increases. For example, suppose that 
for exports the added value inducement coefficient is 0.65, which means $1 in 
exports contributes to $0.65 value added in the domestic economy while the import 
inducement coefficient driven by $1 in exports is $0.35. Job creation inducement 
coefficient shows how many jobs are created over all industries when KRW 1 billion 
of final demand is generated. Employment inducement coefficient shows how many 
people are employed over all industries when KRW 1 billion of final demand is 
generated. on the other hand, employment coefficient measures how many people are 
employed by a company when the company has KRW 1 billion of sales.
Table 5. Average Employment Number and coefficient of Five Major chaebols













Source:  corporate Group Portal of Fair Trade commission (http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr), 
Song and Lee’s (2005) appendix cD.
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industries were 9.2, 18.1, and 16.8, respectively. As such, the employment 
coefficient of chaebols was noticeably lower.
The main reason for employment reduction was the overseas investments 
of chaebols. Figure 1 reports overseas investment by the total companies in 
Korea and by large companies, the latter because of limited available data 
about chaebols’ oversea investments. overseas investment in Korea was 
negligibly small until the early 1990s but rapidly increased after 2004. Large 
companies’ overseas investment was $4.1 billion in 2004 and $20.5 billion in 
2011, a 5 times increase in overseas investment for 7 years. Likewise, chaebols’ 
overseas investment is not exceptional. In the case of Samsung, which 
provides detailed information about overseas investment in its financial 
statements, its overseas investment increased from KRW 3.3 trillion in 2004 
to KRW 15.7 trillion in 2011, about a 5 times increase. As a result, overseas 
investments of chaebols increased foreign employment but decreased the 
employment effect of chaebols’ growth in Korea.
2. Value Added and Employment Effect of Exports
There is no data available for analyzing job creation or employment 
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inducement coefficient caused by increases in the revenues of chaebols. 
Instead, inducement coefficients of added valued, job creation and 
employment driven by both total exports and five major export items are 
examined to evaluate the effect of chaebols’ growth on the domestic economy. 
The number of large companies accounts for only 1 % of exporting companies 
in Korea but they account for 67.7% of the total exports amount in 2009. Top 
50 companies’ exports and the top 10 companies’ were 60.9%, and 37.3% of 
Korean total exports, respectively. Furthermore, large companies account for 
86.5% of exports for the top five products (Korea custom Service, 2010).
Table 6 presents how the inducement coefficient of added value, job 
creation, and employment led by exports changed from 1975 to 2009. Except 
for 1975, exports’ added value inducement coefficient tended to increase until 
1995. Increases in inducement coefficient indicate that the effect of exports 
on the domestic market became stronger. In other words, the dependence of 
Korean exports on imports became weaker. However, exports’ added value 
inducement coefficient evidently decreased after the currency crisis. The 
inducement coefficient was 0.532 in 2009. Such a decrease means that the 
effect of exports on Korea’s economy became weaker after the currency crisis.
The weak effect of exports may be explained by the globalization trend 
that activates international trade and integrates the world economy. To 



























































Source: Economic Statistic System, the Bank of Korea
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survive or compete in the world markets, a company should find ways of 
reducing production costs or obtaining superior raw materials. Since the 
markets for raw materials and intermediate goods are globalized, companies 
tend to import more raw materials or intermediate goods for export, resulting 
in low inducement coefficients of added value.
Table 6 also presents inducement coefficients over time for job creation 
or employment. These coefficients show why the effect of exports on the 
domestic economy was noticeably weakened. Inducement coefficients of job 
creation and employment consistently decreased over time. For example, 
KRW 1 billion of exports created 138.6 jobs and hires of 178.7 persons over 
all industries in 1975. However, the same amount of exports generated 8.7 
persons’ jobs and hires of 6.48 persons in 2009.
The huge decrease in these coefficients may be explained by three factors. 
First, export industries with comparative advantages have changed from labor 
intensive to capital and technology intensive industries. The employment 
coefficient of exports was 94.89 persons in 1975, which was more than the 
86.62 persons industry average. In the mid 1970s, major export products 
were labor intensive. Beginning with 1995, employment inducement 
coefficients of exports began to be smaller than the industry average. Second, 
improvement of labor productivity reduced the employment inducement 
coefficient. According to the labor productivity index, labor productivity 
annually increased by 6.5% in the mining and manufacturing industries. 
Such a productivity improvement reduced labor demand needed for KRW 
1 billion’s sales, decreasing the inducement coefficients. Third, the weak 
effect of exports on the domestic economy may account for reduction of the 
employment inducement coefficient. Because the added value inducement 
coefficient of exports fell down after 1995, exports’ effects on the domestic 
economy became weaker. As a result, the same amount of export demanded 
less employment in the domestic market.
Since the top 5 export items match up with those of major chaebols, these 
items are more related to the effect of chaebols’ growth on the domestic 
economy. Table 7 shows the top five export items and their inducement 
coefficients. Typical items are shipping, automobiles and semiconductors. 
computer and image devices like TVs belonged to the top five items in 1995 
but were excluded from the top five in 2009. computer and image devices are 
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labor intensive products. As such, the top five items also indicate that labor 
intensive products tend to be excluded from major export products.
Automobiles are a typical product that has a high effect on employment 
as well. However, the inducement coefficients for the automobile rapidly 
decreased. For example, the inducement coefficient of job creation decreased 
from 17.28 persons in 1996 to 8.78 persons in 2009. Particularly, the 
inducement coefficient of added value was 0.749 in 1996 and decreased to 
0.661 in 2009. Such decreases indicate that exports in the automobile industry 
rely more on imports. consistent decreases in the inducement coefficient of 
added value appeared in most major export items. Semiconductors, shipping, 
and communications and broadcasting equipment like mobile phones show 
the same reduction of the coefficient. The high reliance of major export 
products on imports implies that the link between exports and the domestic 
market dwindles. The average inducement coefficient of employment for the 
top five export products continued to decrease from 1996 to 2009. The top 
five’s employment inducement coefficient was on average 12.89 persons in 
1996 but decreased to 6.09 persons in 2000, about a one-half decrease for 
only 4 years.5
Evident falls of employment coefficients for chaebols and inducement 
coefficients for exports confirm that the effect of their growth on the domestic 
economy continued to be weaker after the currency crisis. As previously 
mentioned, the weak effect appeared to be due to increases in overseas 
investment of Korean large companies, the structure change of Korean 
industries, higher dependence of exports on imports, and improvement of 
labor productivity. These changes are natural consequences of profit seeking 
process steps taken by companies. The structure change of the export industry 
toward capital and technology intensive industries also resulted from Korean 
economic development processes
The weak effect of chaebols’ growth on the domestic economy provides 
important implications for Korean economic policy. Export-driven economic 
5 Employment substantially decreased due to mass dismissals and restructuring of 
financially distressed firms across all industries immediately after the Asian currency 
crisis. In addition, a sharp decrease in the value of Korean currency at that time 
reduced inducement coefficients of added value and employment as well.
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Table 7. Inducement coefficients of Added Value, Job creation, and Employment for Top 
Five Export Products















(Semiconductor) 15,237 7.87 6.88 0.668
Automobiles 10,468 17.28 14.66 0.749
Shipping 7,208 18.34 15.91 0.668
Home Electronics 
(Image Device) 5,550 21.37 18.42 0.619
computer 5,462 19.06 16.60 0.464
Mean 8,785 14.93 12.89 0.656
2000
Semiconductor 26,006 4.83 4.07 0.497
computer 14,687 8.36 6.31 0.449
Automobile 13,221 12.84 10.35 0.729
Petroleum Products 9,055 1.04 0.80 0.424
Shipping 8,420 13.01 10.97 0.683
Mean 14,227 7.52 6.09 0.543
2005
Semiconductor 29,986 6.16 5.36 0.520
Automobile 29,506 10.73 8.77 0.690
communication & 
Broadcasting Equipment 27,495 8.39 6.93 0.515
Shipping 17,727 9.90 8.39 0.601
Petroleum Products 15,366 0.74 0.57 0.401
Mean 24,016 7.65 6.39 0.557
2009
Shipping 37,223 7.30 6.00 0.569
communication & 
Broadcasting Equipment 29,531 6.18 5.03 0.440
Semiconductor 24,384 5.58 4.88 0.483
Electronic Display Device 23,390 5.69 4.77 0.504
Automobile 22,399 8.78 7.17 0.661
Mean 27,385 6.72 5.57 0.530
Source:  Top 5 Export Items from E-Nara Index in Statistics Korea (http:\\www.index.go.k) 
are adjusted for classification of inter-industry relation.
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models will not be successful in activating the domestic economy anymore. 
Any currency policy or corporate tax incentives to encourage exports will 
not be effective in increasing the domestic market demand. on the contrary, 
it will not be desirable for the government to provide employment incentives 
to large companies like chaebols. Increases in their employment encouraged 
by the government may decrease their efficiency or competitiveness. It is 
noteworthy that employment of chaebols reached the maximum just before 
the currency crisis but some of them went to bankruptcy because of low 
profitability and over-loans.
V. coNcLUSIoNS 
chaebols that demonstrate strong competitiveness in the world markets have 
been the main beneficiary from Korean economic development as well as the 
driving force of Korean economic success. Many criticisms about chaebols 
have been raised since the currency crisis. This study evaluates chaebols by 
analyzing their capital structure, profitability, and ownership structure and 
investigates reasons why their business success has not led to positive ripple 
effects on the whole domestic economy.
chaebols that recorded poor profits before or during the Asian currency 
crisis achieved surprising business performance after the crisis. Average 
net income of five major chaebols increased by 7.3 times for 1999 to 2010. 
Their debt-equity ratio decreased from 342.4% in 1999 to 184.8% in 2010. 
They also had rapid asset expansion by using diverse financial channels. 
Samsung and LG mainly relied on internal funds for their investments, 
while Hyundai Motor and Lotte employed all financial channels such as debt 
increase, internal funds and new equity issues. SK expanded assets mainly by 
substantial equity issues.
Although chaebols achieved high profitability, sound capital structure, 
and successful asset expansion, their ownership structures were getting 
worse than before the currency crisis. The head and his family’s ownership 
decreased from 15.6% in 1987 to 2.65% in 2010, although their inside 
ownership including their affiliates’ was maintained above 45%. The head’s 
controlling power could be stable since their affiliates’ ownership made up for 
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reduction of their head and family’s ownership. As a result, disparity between 
their cash flow ownership and controlling power became larger and larger, 
increasing agency costs. Since increase in ownership of their affiliate results 
in deepening inter-relations among the affiliates, they may face high risks of 
sequential bankruptcy.
This study shows that the positive effect of chaebols’ growth on the 
domestic economy dwindles. The average number of employees of five major 
chaebols drastically reduced soon after the currency crisis and afterward 
gradually increased. Nevertheless, the average employment number for five 
major chaebols was about 460,000 for 2006 to 2010, smaller than for 1991 to 
1995. The employment coefficient decreased from 3.59 persons for 1987 to 
1990 to 1.21 persons for 2006 to 2010.
Exports were not exceptional. The inducement coefficient of added value 
for exports reached 0.674 in 1995 but thereafter continued to decrease to 0.532 
in 2009. As such, the effect of exports on the domestic economy became 
lower than before the crisis. Exports are not expected to increase the domestic 
market demand as much as before. Inducement coefficients of job creation 
and employment evidently show the same trend as well. KRW 1 billion of 
export required 175.7 employees in 1975 but only 6.48 in 2009.
This study suggests four reasons why the effect of chaebols’ or exports’ 
growth on the domestic economy tends to decrease. First, labor demand has 
decreased because of increases in overseas investment. Second, industries 
with comparative advantage in Korea changed toward capital and technology 
intensive industries from labor intensive industries. As a result, labor demand 
has decreased. Third, improvement of labor productivity has reduced 
inducement coefficients of job creation and employment. Last, since the 
inducement coefficient of added value led by exports decreased, the effect of 
exports on the domestic market demand decreased as well. These four reasons 
are not temporary. Noticeable improvement of labor productivity mainly 
caused by new technology developments like IT, structural sophistication of 
Korean industries, and globalization of the economy are some consequences 
of profit seeking activities by individual companies. Therefore, the weak 
effect of chaebols’ and exports’ growth on the domestic economy is in the 
mainstream of a trend rather than a temporary phenomenon. The effect is 
expected to be persistently weaker in the future.
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Export-driven economic models were successful for Korean economic 
development before the Asian currency crisis. These models, however, 
do not seem to provide any possible solution for recent issues such as 
income disparity and unemployment issues in Korea. As such, discussion 
is needed about how to activate the domestic market demand or what 
would be an alternative policy. Economic democratization raised from 
political communities needs to be academically discussed. There is also a 
need to precisely conceptualize economic democratization and its detailed 
policies should be addressed. Finally, any alternative model for the Korean 
economy should provide a solution about unemployment without losing the 
competitiveness of Korean companies.
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